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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to derive the formula of Gross Upward Pricing Pressure
Index (GUPPI ), used on duopoly markets with di¤erentiated products, when we allow
for unilateral equity stakes (expressed as a function of victims market share) to be
endogenously determined. The results show that the unilateral e¤ects of partial acqui-
sitions, as they are measured by GUPPI when the percentage of equity stakes of the
acquirer in the target rm is considered endogenous, may be higher than in the case
where the said percentage is exogenously determined.
JEL classications: G3, L13, L16
Keywords: Di¤erentiated Product Markets; GUPPI ; Logit Demand; Endogenous Partial
Acquisitions.
1 Introduction
Salop and Moresi (2009) were the rst who developed a modied version of Upward Pricing
Pressure (UPP ) methodology to market denition called Gross Upward Pricing Pressure
Index (GUPPI).1 According to this in markets with di¤erentiated products GUPPI mea-
sures only the upward pricing component before netting out the downward pricing pressure
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1The two methodologies are based on Bertrand competition with di¤erentiated products. The UPP
methodology measures the merger induced unilateral e¤ects net of any potential e¢ ciencies emerged from
the merger. Following Farrell and Shapiro (2010) the UPP in pre-merger values on product 1 is dened
as UPP1 = DR12  l2  p2p1   E1(1   l1), where DR12 is the diversion ratio from product 1 to product 2
1
from e¢ ciencies(Moresi, 2010). Mathematically, suppose the merger between products 1
and 2. The GUPPI for product 1 is dened as GUPPI = DR12  l2  (p2=p1).2 Merger
causes gross upward pricing pressure if GUPPI > 0.
In this paper we derive the formula of GUPPI in duopoly markets with unilateral partial
acquisitions and rough information regarding the structure of productsdemand. For this
reason we use a logit demand function (Anderson and de Palma, 1990)3 and we endogenise
the amount of acquired equity stake with respect to the market share of the victim rm.
The rationale behind this follows directly from Willig (1991) who, inter alia, states that the
bigger 2s share, the more the merger will drive up the price of 1, and obversely.
Despite the rich body of literature concerning unilateral e¤ects of partial acquisitions,
none of the existing studies has used logit demand function in order to calculate GUPPI.4
Besides, to the best of our knowledge equity holdings have never been used endogenously
with respect to victim rms market share. Hence, the novelty of this paper is to provide
an alternative index for measuring unilateral e¤ects of partial acquisitions, consistent with
traditional horizontal merger analysis.
The remaining of the paper is organized in the following way: Section 2 presents the
basic model set up and the results. Lastly, section 3 provides some policy implications and
section 4 concludes.
2 The model
In the pre-acquisition stage, each rm i (i = 1; 2) chooses its price pi to maximize its prots
(pi   c0i )Qi(pi; p i) where c0i denotes the marginal cost of rm i, and Qi and p i are the
demand function and the price of the ith competitor, respectively. By assuming a logit
demand function, demand for good i will be
Qi(pi; p i) =
e piP2
j=1 e
 pj
(1)
where  2 (0; 1) is a positive constant denoting the rate of substitution between the
(Shapiro, 1996; Hausman et al. 2011), l2  p2 c2p2 is the variable prot margin of product 2 as a fraction of
revenue, p2p1 is the price of product 2 relative to price of product 1, E1 denotes the merger-induced variable
cost savings for Product 1 and l1  p1 c1p1 is the variable prot margin of product 1 as a fraction of revenue.
In the symmetric case the UPP for each merger product is UPP = DR  l1 l   E. The merger causes
upward pricing pressure if UPP1 > 0 (or UPP > 0).
2If we assume p2 = p1 then GUPPI = DR12  l2 (Salop and Moresi, 2009).
3Logit demand is based on Luces Choice Axiom. See Luce (1959) and Willig (1991).
4Willig (2011) calculates UPP andGUPPI using a general demand function under Bertrand competition
with di¤erentiated products.
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products (the lower the , the greater the di¤erentiation between products).
The equilibrium prices p0i in the pre-acquisition stage are given by the solution to the
following system of equations:
 (p01   c01)Q1(p01; p02)Q2(p01; p02) +Q1(p01; p02) = 0 (2)
 (p02   c02)Q1(p01; p02)Q2(p01; p02) +Q2(p01; p02) = 0 (3)
In the post-acquisition stage where m percent of rm 2 is acquired by rm 1, the prots
of rm 1 are given by
m1 = (p1   c01)Q1(p1; p2) +m(p2   c02)Q2(p1; p2) (4)
In (4), we assume that the marginal costs do not change in the post-acquisition stage. In
contrast to the existing literature about GUPPI calculation, m is determined endogenously
in our analysis. More specically m is assumed to be a function of target rms market
share, i.e. m = m(Q2=(Q1 + Q2)) = m(p1; p2). Hence, the post-acquisition change in the
prots of rm 1 with respect to a change in p1 is given by
@m1
@p1
=  (p1   c01)Q1(p1; p2)Q2(p1; p2) +Q1(p1; p2)
+m0(p1; p2)Q1(p1; p2)Q2(p1; p2)(p2   c02)Q2(p1; p2)
+m(p1; p2)(p2   c02)Q1(p1; p2)Q2(p1; p2) (5)
where m0 > 0 is the derivative of m with respect to Q2=(Q1 +Q2) with m00 < 0.5
Evaluating (5) at the pre-acquisition price levels (Willig, 2011), we get
@m1
@p1

pi=p0i
=  (p01   c01)Q1(p01; p02)Q2(p01; p02) +Q1(p01; p02)
+m0(p01; p
0
2)Q
1(p01; p
0
2)Q
2(p01; p
0
2)(p
0
2   c02)Q2(p01; p02)
+m(p01; p
0
2)(p
0
2   c02)Q1(p01; p02)Q2(p01; p02) (6)
From (2) and by rearranging, we get that the condition for UPP is
5Since we focus on partial rather than full acquisitions, we assume here that m increases as the market
share of the victim rm increases but at a decreasing rate.
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m(p01; p
0
2)
(p02   c02)
p01
 [1 + 0m] > 0 (7)
where 0m is the elasticity of m with respect to the target rms market share evaluated
at the pre-acquisition prices.6
Proposition 1 If the percentage of equity stakes of the acquirer in the target rm is endoge-
nously determined by the market share of the target rm and demand is approximated by the
logit specication in (1), then the GUPPI is given by
GUPPIend = m(p01; p
0
2)
(p02   c02)
p01
 [1 + 0m] (8)
Proposition 2 The value for the GUPPI with exogenous percentage of partial equity stakes,
~m, as per Willig (2011) and the logit demand function in (1) is
GUPPIexlog it = ~m
(p02   c02)
p01
(9)
Combining Propositions 1 and 2, we get Proposition 3
Proposition 3 If the demand is approximated by the logit specication in (1), then the
GUPPI is downward biased when the percentage of equity stakes of the acquirer in the
target rm is assumed to be exogenous. The degree of biasness is captured by 0m.
Proof. Proposition 3 comes straightforwardly from Propositions 1 and 2. If we pick a value
for ~m which is equal to m(p01; p
0
2), then it can be easily shown that GUPPI
end GUPPIexlog it =
GUPPIexlog it  0m > 0.7
According to Proposition 3, there is a degree of biasness between Willigs model of
GUPPI and our specication. Specically, we argue that when one out of the two inter-
related hypotheses in our specication is violated (i.e. logit demand assumption is satised
but m continues to be exogenous) then Willigs GUPPI exhibits a downward biasness. The
level of this biasness is measured by the elasticity of m with the respect to target rms
pre-acquisition market share. More specically, the higher the elasticity, the higher the
downward biasness of Willigs GUPPI.
The analogous expression for (9) if we assume linear demand function of the form Qi =
a pi (a pj)
1 2 (where a > 0)
8 is given by
6Note that in (7) the "diversion" ratio from product 1 to product 2 (Shapiro, 1996; Hausman et al. 2011)
is equal to 1. In our model market shares rather than demand elasticities play crucial role in determining
GUPPI.
7Dividing both sides by GUPPIexlog it, we get that the percentage change in GUPPIs is equal to 
0
m.
8See Singh and Vives (1984) and Alipranti et al. (2014).
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GUPPIexlinear = ~m
(~p02   c02)
~p01
  (10)
where ~p0i (for i = 1; 2) denotes the equilibrium pre-acquisition price of rm i under the
aforementioned linear demand function and  is the diversion ratio (the diversion ratio
coincides with the rate of substitution between the products).9
It can be further shown that the downward bias of the GUPPI with an exogenous m is
evident for any functional form of the demand function.10
3 Policy implications
In this paper we derive an alternative index for measuring unilateral e¤ects of partial acqui-
sitions. We focus on markets with di¤erentiated products and we show that with endogenous
acquired equity stakes (expressed as a function of victims market share) and logit demand
the unilateral e¤ects of partial acquisitions, as they are measured by GUPPI, may be higher
than in the case where the minority shareholdings are not endogenously determined.
Our GUPPI specication is consistent with traditional horizontal merger analysis which
is mainly based on market shares in order to assess the e¤ects of partial acquisitions on
consumer welfare.
4 Conclusion
The scope of this paper is to develop a formula of GUPPI in duopoly markets with unilateral
partial acquisitions and rough information about the productsdemand structure. For this
reason we use a logit demand function and we endogenise the amount of acquired equity
stake with respect to the market share of the victim rm.
The results show that if the percentage of equity stakes of the acquirer in the target rm
is considered exogenous, then the GUPPI is downward biased. In other words, the unilateral
e¤ects of partial acquisitions may be lower with exogenously rather than with endogenously
determined minority shareholdings.
9For a more detailed discussion about the GUPPI under linear demand functions see Hausman et al.
(2011).
10For instance, the GUPPI formula in Willig (2011) with endogenous m and general functional form of
demand function is given by m(p^01; p^
0
2) (p^
0
2 c02)DR12
p^01
 [1 + 0mQ2(p^01;p^02)
Q1(p^01;p^
0
2)+Q
2(p^01;p^
0
2)
 (Q1(p^01;p^02)
Q2(p^01;p^
0
2)
+ 1DR12 )] (where
p^01, p^
0
2 are the pre-acquisition prices under general demand function). The downward bias is given by the
term 
0
mQ
2(p^01;p^
0
2)
Q1(p^01;p^
0
2)+Q
2(p^01;p^
0
2)
 (Q1(p^01;p^02)
Q2(p^01;p^
0
2)
+ 1DR12 ) > 0.
5
We may derive di¤erent results if we assume cost asymmetries or/and possible e¢ ciencies
emerged from the acquisitions. Besides, bilateral equity stakes between rms may also
play a critical role in our specication. Therefore, further research may be based on these
considerations.
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